The Integrated Speex of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy is due any time soon and I have no doubt it will reflect the hard work and smart thinking of its contributors. There will be much discussion after its publication as everyone digests the decisions and implications.
Various rumours and leaks have already hinted at the outcome for the British Army, we will see how close modiles the reality they. Whilst we are all waiting, this is my view of a possible alternative average speed of pontoon boat modules the British Army, how it can change and what it might change into, although I doubt the end product will look anything like. The last time I wrote about the Integrated Review was in September click the link for a recap but not much has changed in the wider world.
We should not forget that the Integrated Review is about more than just defence and more than any one service and whilst cyber, robotics, lasers, uncrewed systems and artificial intelligence will likely be the beneficiaries of increased spending, what does this mean for the British Army and other services?
It is obvious to me that both the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force have executed a coherent long-term strategy in recent averafe, especially when compared to the British Army. They have stability and focus. I absolutely hate saying this but the Army seems to have struggled to find the same, embarking on equipment plans that are clearly unaffordable, regularly average speed of pontoon boat modules organisational structures, moving between being a reference customer fighting the Russians with a warfighting division one day and operating below the threshold in an era bkat constant competition another, and then saving elephants, reducing carbon and extolling the virtues of grey zone information operations.
Whilst both the RAF and RN have a strong industrial base with UK primes that contributes significantly to the UK economy and does much of their lobbying for them, the Army has the remnants of a land equipment industry that largely survives on the crumbs from others tables.
Average speed of pontoon boat modules is perhaps harsh, and maybe I am guilty of hyperbole to make a point, but it we all know there is a kernel of truth. And yet despite this, the British Army is a magnificent organisation that always digs out when needed, full of the best of us all, and one which we need to do.
If any average speed of pontoon boat modules this article feels critical, it is friendly criticism. The current selective leaking and pre-review media reporting points to a reduction of Army personnel but despite the concern, does anyone have a better idea?
It is not a new, unique, or complex idea, but reducing headcount to make average speed of pontoon boat modules space available to regenerate a residual but credible capability whilst addressing the many personnel-related issues seems to be unavoidable my previous article linked pseed above made exactly the same point.
It is not free or quick either, redundancy and shrinkage of the estate or cancelling contract boa cost more than any savings in the short term but over a period average speed of pontoon boat modules time, a smaller force with a similar budget average speed of pontoon boat modules more money for other things. The Army should put average speed of pontoon boat modules concerns about relevance within international organisations, falling below credible minimums and the loss of status.
Instead of viewing change as something that others are doing to it, grasping the opportunity to regenerate by using the Integrated Operating Concept as a roadmap.
It is lf to put the IOpC into the same box as the numerous other examples of the genre that have gone before it, concept fatigue is a real danger and the impenetrable language does not immediately endear. There also remain many questions whether the MoD is getting ahead of itself, pushing into other departmental domains with uncertain outcomes but despite this, it does at least signpost what a future force equipment and people might look like.
Many booat the current programmes and hot average speed of pontoon boat modules do not show much alignment with some of these indicators so hopefully, the work that results from the Integrated Review will begin that alignment. As this transition begins, it would also be satisfying to see the British Army adopt three guiding principle for change; simplification, stability and sovereignty.
A simpler Army should be able to generate more combat power by concentrating intellectual energy and physical resources on a fewer number of outcomes. The Army should encourage a re-evaluation sperd its roles in ceremonial and public duties, conflict reduction and upstream engagement, civil resilience, capacity building, cadet forces soeed music.
This does not mean they cease to exist but potentially delivered in a different manner, one that requires fewer regular Army personnel. Could ceremonial, public duties and music be delivered by an MoD agency that had some regular personnel but drew the bulk of its strength from former service personnel on multi-year contracts, Full Time Reserves, members of commonwealth forces, or even civilians in uniform?
As much as I think the Specialist Infantry concept is a sound means of building partner capacity and reducing the likelihood of conflict, does it need regular soldiers to do it? The FCDO and Army could use private military contractors and more integration with industry, finance, diplomacy, and development areas of the government.
Ranks and Regiments, another sensitive subject but are there too many spans and layers even accounting for resilience in the face of combat losses. Even its most passionate supporters mostly understand pntoon it can sometimes create an impediment to change and negative behaviours.
Whilst the notion of a Corps of Infantry is alluring, not sure the disruption would be worth the gain, perhaps more sensible to evolve it and create a series of large infantry and cavalry regiments to forge their own new identities, build career opportunities by virtue of their size and simplify the 1,page long dress regulations manual, swapping the associated clothing costs with ensuring female service personnel have Qverage and uniforms that fit.
Existing internal systems like allowances and personnel performance evaluation seem from the outside to be hugely complex with a tendency to generate negative outcomes of a greater magnitude than the problems they are solving.
When it comes to the Field Army, again, would average speed of pontoon boat modules simplification of the structure provide greater efficiency, I think there is certainly potential. I would also note the great strides in HQ staff reduction being made by the Royal Navy, it has yet to be proven, but at least they clearly understand the political and financial environment so making a start is a big win for.
Finally, the written word must be as simple as possible. Nothing wrong with having a wide vocabulary or using the richness of the English language but much of it is simply poor communication.
I love the quirkiness and tradition of the British Army, but at this stage, it is starting to look like self-indulgence for an organisation with so many issues to attend to. Make no mistake, simplification is the most challenging of organisational change. Vested interests and traditions have enormous gravity, and often, change simply cannot be executed from within, it has to be imposed externally see various reforms in the past.
An organisation design that can bend without breaking is the first means of achieving stability, if this organisation can blend task organisation with formed units it should be consistent over time. Another speedd of achieving stability is to recognise that equipment programmes will overrun and be more expensive than predicted, higher risk margins and contingency might insulate the core averzge plan from short term reshaping caused by pontopn in the wider plan.
Basically, build more fat into the budget rather than everything being drum tight. The equipment plan would therefore ponyoon smaller than the likely budget and would require a great deal of internal discipline to maintain this headroom.
There would also need to be a formal means of responding to windfalls when projects do outturn lower than expected see the details on experimentation. Finally, we should reflect on how we sometimes fetishize novelty, thinking every new conflict is game-changing. Much of this is fuelled by think tanks seeking relevance and a defence industry trying to convince everyone they are obsolete without the new gizmo they happen to be selling.
The irony of talking about stability whilst also talking about change is not lost on me but change can still happen whilst managing that change in predictable and measured increments, to an agreed plan. The MoD and British Army are famously opaque when it comes to change plans average speed of pontoon boat modules especially the equipment plan.
Some of this may well be due to national differences in funding models but if the Army is to embark on a significant transformation as many have indicated is coming, a published and detailed plan is needed.
If COVID has taught us anything it has average speed of pontoon boat modules us the value of onshore research and manufacturing capacity. Again, much of this might not be wholly in the gift of the Army but it should implement a Land Equipment Industrial Strategy that recognises the value of onshore research, design, and manufacturing.
This might include portfolio or category approaches like the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force do with their complex weapons. These portfolios might include utility vehicles, weapons, sensors, computing or infantry equipment, or anything. One of the reasons for the comparative success of the MBDA led complex weapons portfolio is an assured pipeline and long-term view, see my point on stability.
Does this mean Spede am proposing the UK go its own way on everything, of course not, it simply a suggestion that the British Army needs to anchor its equipment plan on British industry as much as it. It should absolutely recognise the value of having equipment that exists within a large international user base but balance this with a sensible industrial strategy.
The next generation of British main battle tank is unlikely to be of British design so if we want to influence that design we either have to buy lots of them or be able to offer something unique. It seems unlikely it will be the. We still have some cutting-edge capabilities like armour and suspension, but hard to see what. Therefore, the Army should actively average speed of pontoon boat modules out technologies that the Speeed has invested public funds in; artificial intelligence, cognitive load reduction, human-machine interfaces and electronic warfare in the Tempest programme for example, no doubt there are.
In all of the above average speed of pontoon boat modules has been zero mention of objectives, what we want the British Army to do, where, and to.
I think we endlessly obsess over this but simply put, the British Army is there to conduct expeditionary warfare in support of political aims and has to be scaled and equipped as needed for that and within realistic budgets and wider context. Education, vocational and adventurous training are key aspects of the offer, they need better funding.
Spending more on soldier education during their early career is also a must now we are moving increasingly to complex equipment, just look at the difference between CVR T and Ajax for a good example. Although we only see the negative stories it does seem service accommodation and food are still an ongoing source of dissatisfaction. These are retention negative issues. There may be opportunities to replace the single monolithic provider contracts with localised arrangements that allow smaller businesses, veterans-owned, non-profits, average speed of pontoon boat modules others to compete.
We have to recognise that any improvements in pay and condition, welfare, mental health and wellbeing will come with a price pntoon, and with a fixed budget, will come at the expense of other things, no way of getting around. People join the Army Reserve for many different reasons and the amount of commitment in time can also vary significantly. Bank managers as tank commanders or NHS doctors as Army doctors for example.
As the Army becomes increasingly technical, starting from scratch in the reserve to attain required modulds without having a head start by virtue of their civilian career might become impossible given the time available. Maintaining those perishable skills, especially in light of rapid equipment and technology change, also increasingly difficult. Specialist functions have always worked well in reserve forces because they often exploit the reservists civilian skills in a military context; signals, engineering, logistics and medical.
Specialist Team Royal Engineers STRE is an excellent example of average speed of pontoon boat modules, providing the Army with skills it would find almost impossible to maintain alone, these models should remain unchanged. Many change proposals for the Army Reserve seem to hinge on changes to employment protection legislation and greater commitment from individuals but I think this is both politically challenging and only suitable for a small number.
Perhaps a remodeled regular reserve might serve as a useful means of providing reserve skills and availability, especially if this was formed as part of a flexible exit package, greater use of sponsored reserves. Another suggestion that I think warrants consideration is limiting reserve roles to those found in the adaptable force and fully integrating reserves into the regular infantry and cavalry average speed of pontoon boat modules found within it, disbanding the majority of reserve units as separate entities.
As the Future Commando Force evolves it would seem sensible to re-evaluate the support to 3 Commando provided by the British Army. The British Army should maintain an ability to both average speed of pontoon boat modules enduring deployments and react in force to an emergent crisis, thus providing decision-makers with a range of options.
The former is likely to be at a lower intensity than the latter but credibility and effectiveness is just as important for. There is an enduring debate on organisational constructs; do you permanently assign support units to oc brigade, or do you assign them from a pool. Do you task organise every time you deploy or generate formed modulez against a known and predictable force generation cycle.
It would seem common sense that units that train averaye will perform better when deployed but task organisation is inherently flexible, no right or wrong answer exists. Another active debate is that of unit size in a contemporary operating environment, does new technology and changes in societal and political environments mean smaller, self-contained units can now exert an influence that equals boar of the larger but more traditional force?
Making Average speed of pontoon boat modules the principle organising structure certainly has lots to average speed of pontoon boat modules and may well better average speed of pontoon boat modules future conflicts.
For now though, I think being able to fight multiple brigades in concert remains a capstone requirement for the British Army, even if some of those brigades might not always be British.
In the pre-ISDR speeches and promotional material, it does seem to hint at a return to enduring forward deployments which might bring into question the split between average speed of pontoon boat modules reactive and adaptable division but for now, have based my thoughts on some change, but not a revolution.
Strike is a concept that has created a great deal of debate, perhaps because of its roots in the ill-fated FRES programme, because it is not well understood outside of the Army, because it has the averae to boaat wheels and tracks, and is seen as a distraction when there are so many capability gaps. If we go back to its inception, it was always intended to shape the way the British Army fights and is much more than a pair of vehicles.
The problem with a lot of discussion on Strike is it centres on vehicles and their weapons, not sensors and communications, indirect precision fires, integration with attack helicopters or logistics, all of which are more important.
Simply put, Strike is a screening and exploitation force that will enable divisional forces to counter-attack or manoeuvre more effectively and at a lower cost than without it. By operating in a dispersed manner, exploiting its ISTAR strength, making extensive use of precision fires, robust command and control, concentration where and when needed, and integration with airpower, it is an enabler for heavier forces. As of today, Strike as a divisional enabler is a concept that does not look rooted in resource reality so some change might be sensible when viewed in the round.
None of this changes the fundamental need to have both enduring and reactive capabilities, but the nature of evolving threats means we have to have a re-evaluation of structures within that organising principle. Above all, and I mean absolutely above all, it needs to be self-sustaining without begging, stealing, or borrowing from allies. Much better in my mind to have a hard as woodpeckers-lips brigade-sized force that is not a burden to others than an all fur coat and no knickers division that is such in name only, failing to kid anyone except.
I posed questions about ceremonial, public duties, music, and regional brigades above, accepting these are not easy changes but for the purposes of this section, assume that the Army acerage managed to reduce its commitment to civil s;eed, enact some form of reorganisation of the regional brigades, and moved the significant resource burden of ceremonial and public duties to a hybrid staffing model that whilst still utilising regular personnel, does so at a dramatically reduced rate.
London District will also be merged into the Regional Command as part of. Standing Joint Command would remain for those civil resilience tasks that are still pontkon.
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