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Within that framework, the following sections outline a few key choices that service leaders need to make. There are two clear challenges for the Building A Wooden Spaceship 500g joint forces of the United States: standardizing a system for operations across multiple domains e. Addressing the first challenge demands that every branch of the U. As combat systems and advanced artificial intelligence AI platforms continue to develop, they must be seamlessly integrated within and between all U.

Currently, however, each military branch is pursuing its own C2 design. Defense contractors and other interested parties will lobby for their respective systems, but the choice should be based on the ability to implement the system across all services, agreement among the branches, and a clear standard for cybersecurity. Because a standard C2 platform is the optimal solution for the modern battlefield, all U.

It is premature to estimate the eventual cost of such a unified system, but deciding on this system now will inevitably save money by facilitating coordination between every branch of the U. The DOD, for its part, must decide on a platform, take bids on delivery of the system, and obtain executive branch and congressional approval on a process and timeline for implementation.

Congress should use its legislative authority to ensure compliance through reporting requirements. The second overarching challenge for the U. Service members have a critical role to play in determining future priorities since these systems and platforms will have a direct impact on their daily lives and their ability to function on the battlefield.

The mission of a Futures Command is modernization. A futures reserve unit in each branch would prove critical given the recent effort to recruit and fund PhDs in the military and DOD. The service branches should also develop practices for curating the massive amounts of data generated for AI systems.

In the Star Wars universe, the Kessel Run refers to an impossible task that is completed in a short time. The Air Force had that in mind when it set out to develop software quickly and in response to an uncertain environment. The United States should be investing in innovation and research rather than stale production lines for weapons that have outlived their usefulness or new weapons that can never meet their design objectives.

Instead of bolstering the National Science Foundation and encouraging scholars to seek trivial connections to national security in research projects, the DOD should be granted additional authority to invest in other public and private research startups and incubators through the individual service research offices e. These funds should not be restricted and should be open to every research university and think tank capable of doing advanced research that will help drive innovation within the defense ecosystem.

This is not an argument for expanding federal funding for research but rather extending existing research opportunities to a much wider pool of qualified institutions. For too long the U. The United States must leverage its deep technological base to meet coming challenges; as of now the U. Research should be focused on applying novel technical capabilities to the modern battlefield. The idea that the United States has fallen behind China in the AI arms race is only true based on a measurement of research quantity, not quality.

For example, Google recently published a paper demonstrating quantum supremacy, when a quantum device such as a quantum computer can solve a problem that no traditional computer realistically can. AI is only as useful as the data fed into the algorithms. Ensuring that the U. Reorganizing around Futures Command groups and using data wranglers would enable all service branches to innovate as the United States still enjoys a number of political, economic, and strategic advantages relative to prospective rivals.

Since its formal inception in , the Air Force has fended off challenges to its place in the structure of the U. Still, the Air Force has struggled to introduce new aircraft. In general, the Air Force has spent a lot of money to get less capacity.

A change of direction is in order. The structure and capabilities of the Air Force should maximize operational readiness, taking into consideration procurement difficulties associated with current weapons systems still under production. Air Force is tasked with dominating the air, outer space, and cyberspace by using advanced and emerging technology. The Air Force needs to be an innovative service to keep up with the rapid pace of technical change.

This will be difficult. This is perplexing to say the least. While the service has emphasized incorporating advanced technology for air and space operations, overall readiness and pilot training have decreased substantially, contributing to a steady rise in aircraft mishaps. If the Air Force is unable to hold onto its best people, it will struggle to adapt to changing operating environments including outer space and cyberspace and new technology such as AI and quantum computing.

That is unsustainable. As the airspace in which the Air Force operates becomes increasingly crowded and contested, this places a premium on unmanned vehicles that can loiter and are capable of executing strike, surveillance, and resupply missions. A focus for now on drones and a reliance on a revitalized F Eagle aircraft through the FEX platform is certainly warranted. The recent move to establish the 16th Air Force, which is focused on cyberspace and electronic warfare, is also a welcome development.

A strategic pause and reset are desperately needed. A realistic assessment of threats would allow the Army to prioritize and eliminate or offload unnecessary missions. In , the Army created the Army Futures Command. It originally established six priorities:. The United States should divest from other outdated weapons systems�including, in particular, the Abrams tank�that are unlikely to serve a major purpose on the future battlefield, or at least in the battlefields that are truly critical to U.

Army should be substantially smaller and postured mostly for hemispheric defense. A grand strategy of restraint would eliminate most permanent garrisons on foreign soil and rely more heavily on reservists and National Guard personnel for missions closer to the U. Such a posture would reduce the likelihood that U.

That, in turn, would generate substantial savings over the next decade. Developing better and modern versions of artillery is another key task for the Army. That would allow the U. While drones for surveillance and precision strikes are useful, in a future war the United States will need functional unmanned vehicles that can deliver artillery support and fire weapons from a distance, minimizing harm to U. These tools would benefit the entire U.

The Army needs portable sensors ready to detect incoming fires. Thinking about this critical function is more important than developing a new helicopter or other vertical lift platform e. If the U. To meet current recruitment goals, the Army has waived certain requirements and increased enlistment bonuses. An emphasis on quality, rather than quantity, could reduce turnover, ensure new enlistees complete their requisite training, and ultimately improve retention.

A focus on readiness could also help. A failure to meet those basic requirements has driven qualified personnel from the force. No branch of the U. While the increase in research, development, testing, and evaluation is an important step in creating a more lethal and agile force, a failure to meet readiness goals will impede force transformation.

The Army needs to rethink the size of the force needed given the effort to modernize overall. At a time when two successive presidential administrations have pledged to draw down operations in the greater Middle East, the United States should refocus on establishing a lean and agile ground force that can retain the best people while allowing the marginal performers to transition out.

In recent years, the U. Navy has operated under the assumption that it can get all that it wants without a clear articulation of what it needs�though the situation may be changing. It requires maintenance. It requires operational costs.

Many strategy documents simply assume that considerably more money must be made available to the military�and leave it to the politicians to figure out how. The Navy should reject such advice, prioritize among competing desires, and focus on what is genuinely needed to achieve vital national security objectives.

In the near term, this means prioritizing current operations. The Navy must expand both its capacities and capabilities. Newer platforms would also translate to less maintenance time, further increasing the number of vessels ready for service at any given time.

In the interim, this leaves more older ships in service longer, along with their additional repair and maintenance costs. Other hard choices cannot simply be imagined away. This report focuses on two key acquisitions programs to highlight tradeoffs within the surface fleet: the Gerald R. As designed, Ford -class ships are the largest and most capable warships on the planet.

But little else about the ships�including whether their actual performance matches their designed capabilities or when the ships will attain full operability�can be predicted with any confidence.

Former Navy Secretary Richard Spencer staked his reputation on ensuring that the advanced weapons elevators�large lifts that transport bombs and missiles from inside the ship to the flight deck�aboard USS Gerald R. Ford CVN would all work before the ship set out for trials.

Other critics fault a systemic lack of accountability throughout the Navy. In an era of defense dominance, when adversaries can use relatively cheap but accurate weapons to attack large and exquisite platforms, how will the carriers perform? Not well, according to some knowledgeable critics, including retired Navy Capt. Henry J. For now, Congress has conspired to thwart any fundamental reconsideration of the centrality of the aircraft carrier to the modern surface fleet.

If the Navy is truly committed to expanding fleet capacity quickly, and with minimal risk, it is imperative that it hold the line against anything likely to lead to costly delays. These types of adversaries would privilege the need for naval and air power over ground forces, which have been geared to fighting nonstate actors and insurgents over the Building A Wooden Spaceship 01 past two decades.

Navy has an extraordinarily ambitious set of objectives, and the demands placed on the service already exceed its ability to meet them. What the Heritage Foundation casts as a requirement is a choice. Strategic requirements are not handed down from on high but reflect the dominant strategic paradigm.

A commitment to maintaining the free movement of raw materials, essential commodities, and finished goods was a core mission for the U. Today, the situation is much different. Most international actors, including even modern rivals such as Russia and China, depend on the free flow of maritime trade and are therefore highly incentivized to try to keep these waterways open.

Navy deploying small, surface combatants in their home waters. In effect, therefore, the U. Navy has been operating as a global coastal constabulary. This practice should stop. The presumption that the U. The aim should be to prevent others from limiting access to the open oceans while not threatening to deny anyone else the peaceful use of those same seas. That mission can and should be shared with other countries, most of whom will be operating near their shores, and thus highly motivated�and able�to defend their sovereign waters.

Marine Corps Gen. Does the U. The response to these sorts of questions was dramatic and forceful. As Marine Corps planners recognize, there is a great need for large numbers of cheap autonomous naval systems that can overwhelm the enemy, and these are preferable to expensive and manned systems.

The Navy and Marine Corps should not be pushing new amphibious platforms when they are unable to maintain their current craft in a steady state of readiness. Since then the triad has become dogma. A reexamination of its value considering technological developments, advances in intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, and changes in adversary capabilities is overdue.

These investments in nuclear weapons and missile defense demonstrate that strategic deterrence remains central to U. What are the threats the United States wants to deter, and can nuclear weapons and missile defense help mitigate them? Raising these questions reveals that some elements of the nuclear modernization plan are superfluous and that some missile defense choices are likely to push rivals to develop destabilizing counterstrategies.

The plan is not meant to expand the arsenal; as new systems get introduced, old ones will be phased out. Supporters of the nuclear modernization plan claim that it will only eat up a small portion of overall military spending. That is true given the very high topline for the budget, but this does not imply that nuclear modernization will be cheap and easy. Initial cost estimates are already growing. The B-2 Spirit bomber program which wildly overran its initial cost projections offers a cautionary tale for its secretive and expensive successor, the B Raider.

Before developing new nuclear capabilities, we need to decide whether they are necessary for strategic deterrence. Arguments about the relatively low price of systems are hardly compelling if the United States does not need to buy them in the first place.

The B gravity bomb, for example, is superfluous given U. Increased spending on strategically dubious capabilities also extends to missile defense. Adjusting American grand strategy toward restraint would mandate a different approach to strategic deterrence. Modernizing the U. The primary goal of strategic deterrence, preventing nuclear first use against America and its allies, would remain the same under restraint.

Instead of pursuing flexibility to respond to a wide variety of threats, the three pillars of strategic deterrence under restraint are removal of peripheral threats through diplomacy; shifting a greater defense burden to allies; and adopting a conventional military posture that enables deterrence by denial�discouraging enemy action by denying a quick and easy victory.

Greater reliance on diplomacy could contain or remove potential threats that current U. For example, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran allowed the United States to reduce nuclear proliferation risks through diplomacy. Arms control measures can help set guardrails on the most dangerous aspects of great power competition, allowing for a degree of strategic trust and stability that is important for averting nuclear disaster.

Another key component of a redesigned U. Given the stakes involved for all parties, the deterrent threats by local actors might prove more credible than those issued by a distant United States. Encouraging allies to develop their own asymmetric capabilities would empower them to contribute more to deterring regional conflicts. Gradually reducing the forward deployment of U. The United States would still have an interest in deterring nuclear first use against its allies�or the use of nuclear weapons in any context.

The third pillar of a new U. The military strategies adopted by the United States, China, and Russia that emphasize early, deep conventional strikes further increase the escalation risks. Under this new approach, nuclear weapons and homeland missile defense would play reduced roles. On the missile defense side, U. For at least two decades, the U. Reconstructing U. Security budgets need to view U.

Diplomacy, for example, has grown stagnant, but the Trump administration seems determined to hasten its demise. The United States can divest some of its legacy military apparatus and focus on innovating for the future while also investing a small fraction of these funds to deal with a range of threats to public safety that are not amenable to military solutions.

Our true strategic reserve is more than the manpower that the military can marshal and the expertise in delivery, logistics, and analysis that the military can offer. The capacity and the expertise of the American people is a strength that will see us through crises. This report has outlined a plan for moving the United States toward a more sustainable national security posture predicated on restraint. Conventional forces should be modernized for future fights, not geared toward sustaining the war on terror.

Finally, the United States needs a modern approach to strategic deterrence that places greater emphasis on denying the ability of other great powers to project offensive military forces by using conventional capabilities rather than the nuclear triad.

Security comes through prudence, not overwhelming force, permanent alliances, or massive investments in weapons platforms. Defending the United States requires a judicious application of the many instruments of American power, not reckless overseas military adventures that have cost too many lives and too much treasure. A clear consideration of U. Aircraft carriers CVNs : the largest ships in the U.

Navy and the centerpiece of U. Arresting gear: mechanical system that rapidly decelerates aircraft when landing on a platform such as an aircraft carrier. Command and control C2 : set of organizational and technical processes employed to accomplish missions. Dual band radar: combines radar systems into one integrated system for easier operation, maintenance, upgrade, and targeting. Maritime choke points e. Nuclear Posture Review NPR : major policy document that sets out the nuclear strategy and policies of a new administration; typically includes overviews of the U.

Operational readiness: capacity of a unit to perform its designated combat or combat support function. Smart power: strategic use of both hard military and soft power diplomacy and trade to achieve foreign policy ends. Eric Gomez is director of defense policy studies; Christopher Preble is vice president for defense and foreign policy studies; Lauren Sander is external relations manager for defense and foreign policy studies; and Brandon Valeriano is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute.

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