It has been created to quickly disseminate fast-rising scholarly work on the Covid epidemic. The Covid breakout challenges all areas of economics including, but not only, health, industrial organization, macroeconomics, finance, history, development, inequality, political economy and public finance, and concerns theory as well as empirical evidence.
We are welcoming submissions in all these areas and we aim to have a wide geographical coverage. Covid Economics is special in three respects:. The vetting process aims at making Covid Economics a reliable source of on-going academic research. There is no preset periodicity of the issues. They are posted whenever a sufficient number of papers are accepted.
Submissions are invited from all researchers, not just those affiliated with CEPR. They can be uploaded here. Please note that if you wish to submit or have already submitted your paper to a journal that is not on the list of journals who will accept papers previously published in Covid Economics , you must get their agreement prior to submission to Covid Economics.
You also must clear the situation if you have already submitted the same paper to a journal on the list, since some journals specify that they will only accept a suitably revised version. For all enquiries, please email [email protected]. I calibrate an eco-epidemiological age-structured SIR model of the B. Three-quarters of the welfare benefit of the vaccine can be achieved with a speed of , full vaccination per day.
A 1-week delay in the vaccination campaign raises the death toll by approximately 2,, and it reduces wealth by 8 billion euros. Because of the large heterogeneity of the rates of hospitalization and mortality across age classes, it is critically important for the number of lives saved and for the economy to vaccinate older people first. Any departure from this policy has a welfare cost.
Prioritizing the allocation of vaccines to the most vulnerable people save 70k seniors, but it also increases the death toll of younger people by 14k.
Vaccine nationalism is modeled by assuming two identical Frances, one with a vaccine production capacity and the other without it.
I also measure the welfare impact of the strong French anti-vax movement, and of the prohibition of an immunity passport. Analysis of new panel data indicates that eviction moratoria reduced evictions and resulted in redirection of scarce household financial resources to immediate consumption needs, notably including food and grocery spending.
We also find that eviction moratoria reduced household food insecurity and mental stress, with larger effects evidenced among African American households. Findings suggest broad salutary effects of eviction moratoria during a period of widespread virus and economic distress. Using a sample of countries, we evaluate the effect of the pre-Covid fiscal space on the size of the fiscal stimulus packages in response to the virus.
We find that higher ratings and higher tax revenues to public debt predict the size of fiscal stimuli, while public debt to GDP does not. Following the Great Lockdown in , it is important to take stock of lessons learned. How effective have different containment measures been in slowing the spread of Covid? Have containment measures been costly in terms of economic growth, fiscal balances, and accumulated debt?
This paper finds that countries with previous SARS experience acted fast and "smart", and were able to contain the virus by relying mainly on public health measures �testing, contact tracing, and public information campaigns� rather than stay-at-home requirements.
Using past coronavirus outbreaks as an instrumental variable, we show that countries with past experience were able to contain the virus in a smart way, reducing transmission and deaths while also experiencing higher economic growth in In particular, the drastic shift to telework has dramatically changed how people work. However, to the best of our knowledge, the effects of WFH on productivity are still unclear. By leveraging unique surveys conducted at four manufacturing firms in Japan, we identify the possible factors of productivity changes due to WFH.
Our main findings are as follows. First, after ruling out the time-invariant component of individual productivity and separate trends specific to employee attributes, we find that workers who worked from home experienced productivity declines more than those who did not. Second, our analysis shows that poor WFH setups and communication difficulties are the major reasons for productivity losses. Third, we find that the mental health of workers who work from home is significantly better than that of workers who are unable to work from home.
We use Upstream And Downstream Questions Linear Equations Ag mobility data as a proxy for economic activity and compare the first wave of COVID to the second one. Overall, our results show that NPIs were the main explanatory factor behind the mobility reduction in advanced OECD countries during the first wave. Focusing on 6 European countries in particular, we observe that those most affected during the first wave display higher elasticities to mobility restrictions, except for Italy where restrictions and the sanitary situation had similar impacts on mobility.
Looking at the relative effects of different types of NPIs we see that more stringent measures had more impact on mobility.
Nevertheless, we remain cautious regarding these last estimates as the rapid sequencing of NPIs likely implies issues of statistical identification. A much debated issue in the COVID state aid to Upstream And Downstream Questions Class 10 Not firms is the extent to which these measures keep non-viable firms afloat. What are the characteristics of firms that receive aid and are they viable in the long term?
Based on a survey of firms in the Netherlands, we find that on average, government support goes to better-managed firms and to those with low turnover expectations and high turnover uncertainty. This suggests that COVID state aid tends to go to firms that are most in need of it now and are more likely to be viable in the long term. An older population, fewer hospital beds, lack of universal BCG tuberculosis vaccination, and greater urbanization are associated with higher mortality.
The death rate has a consistent strong positive relationship with the Gini coefficient for income. The elasticity of Covid deaths with respect to the Gini coefficient, evaluated at sample means, is 0. Combining a survey of Swiss firms with a quasi-experimental research design finds that the pandemic caused firms to reduce their investment plans by over one-eighth.
Firms in regions more exposed to the virus and industries more sensitive to government-imposed restrictions cut their investments more. Both financial constraints and increased uncertainty contributed to downward revisions, which concern investments to extend the production capacity above all.
By contrast, the pandemic stimulated investments driven by technological factors or investments of innovative firms.
This paper finds empirical evidence that faster and smarter containment measures were associated with lower fiscal responses to the COVID shock. We also find that initial conditions, such as fiscal space, income, health preparedness and budget transparency were important in shaping the amount and design of the COVID fiscal response. Stay-at-home policies due to the Covid pandemic have drastically increased housework and childcare. Men changed their participation in household chores that are quasi-leisure, such as shopping and playing with children.
We also document that an unbalanced division of the increased household chores during the lockdown, in particular on cleaning and childcare, is directly linked to an increase of the intrahousehold conflicts.
To conclude, this period did not structurally affect gender roles and stereotypes at home, despite minor intrahousehold changes. We evaluate the implications of relaxing the Supplementary Leverage Ratio during the COVID market disruption for bank balance sheet composition and credit provision. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to causally identify the effect of the SLR regulation change on bank level outcomes. We find that the relaxation may have eased Treasury market liquidity by allowing banks to hold modestly greater inventories of Treasuries, and further allowed for a significant expansion of traditional bank credit.
Our findings suggest that this risk-invariant leverage ratio was binding for banks during COVID, weakly affected bank liquidity provision in Treasury markets, and strongly affected banks' portfolio composition across asset classes, amounting to a shift of banks' loan supply schedules.
Thus, we highlight that countercyclical relaxation of uniform leverage constraints can increase bank credit provision during economic downturns. Given the binding nature of the SLR, the relaxation of this constraint may be more effective than other countercyclical measures in allowing banks to extend credit.
Using aggregate-level data on Japanese multinational corporations MNCs in major host countries and regions, this paper investigates the impact of COVID on global production and supply chains with a focus on East Asia. I find that the pandemic had substantial impacts on the performance sales, employment, and investment of Japanese MNCs and global supply chains exports to Japan and exports to third countries in Q1�Q3 China recovered quickly in Q2 and grew in Q3, whilst the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the rest of the world had still not fully recovered in Q3 Importantly, lockdown and containment policies in host countries had large negative impacts on the sales and employment of Japanese MNCs.
In contrast, I did not find positive effects of economic support policies on firm performance. Interestingly, whilst the firm expectations and business plans of Japanese MNCs were negatively affected by the COVID pandemic, their business confidence increased with strong overall government policy responses in host countries in Q1 In this paper, we shed light on the impacts of the COVID pandemic on the labor market, and how they have evolved over most of the year Relying primarily on microdata from the CPS and state-level data on virus caseloads, mortality, and policy restrictions, we consider a range of employment outcomes�including permanent layoffs, which generate large and lasting costs�and how these outcomes vary across demographic groups, occupations, and industries over time.
We also examine how these employment patterns vary across different states, according to the timing and severity of virus caseloads, deaths, and closure measures. We find that the labor market recovery of the summer and early fall stagnated in late fall and early winter. As noted by others, we find low-wage and minority workers are hardest hit initially, but that recoveries have varied, and not always consistently, between Blacks and Hispanics.
Statewide business closures and other restrictions on economic activity reduce employment rates concurrently, but do not seem to have lingering effects once relaxed. In contrast, virus deaths�but not caseloads�not only depress current employment, but produce accumulating harm.
We conclude with policy options for states to repair their labor markets. The Covid Pandemic led to changes in expenditure patterns that can introduce significant bias in the measurement of Consumer Price Index CPI inflation.
Using publicly-available data on card transactions, I update the official CPI weights and re-calculate inflation with Covid consumption baskets. I find that the US CPI underestimated the Covid inflation rate, as consumers spent relatively more on food with positive inflation, and less on transportation and categories experiencing deflation. The bias peaked in May, when US Covid annual inflation was 0.
I find similar evidence of higher Covid inflation in 12 of 19 additional countries. The COVID outbreak and the measures to contain the virus have caused severe disruptions to labor supply and demand worldwide. Understanding who is bearing the burden of the crisis and what drives it is crucial for designing policies going forward. Using the U. The main finding is that less educated women with young children were the most adversely affected during the first nine months of the crisis. The loss of employment of women with young children due to the burden of additional childcare is estimated to account for 45 percent of the increase in the employment gender gap, and to reduce total output by 0.
Based on a standard epidemiological model, we derive and apply empirical tests of the hypothesis that contacts, as proxied by mobility data, have an effect on the spread of the coronavirus epidemic, as summarized by the reproduction rates, and on economic activity, as captured by subsequent initial claims to unemployment benefits. We show that changes in mobility through the first quarters of , be it spontaneous or mandated, had significant effects on both the spread of the coronavirus and the economy.
Strikingly, we find that spontaneous social distancing was no less costly than mandated social distancing. Our results suggest that the rebound in economic activity when stay-at-home orders were lifted was primarily driven by the improvement in epidemiological parameters.
In other words, without the reduction in the reproduction rate of the coronavirus, we could have expected a doubling down on spontaneous social distancing. This paper examines employment patterns by wage group over the course of the coronavirus pandemic in the United States using microdata from two well-known data sources from the Bureau of Labor Statistics: the Current Employment Statistics and the Current Population Survey.
We find that both establishments paying the lowest average wages and the lowest wage workers had the steepest decline in employment and are still the furthest from recovery as of the most recent data for workers in December and establishments in January We disentangle the extent to which the effect observed for low wage workers is due to these workers being concentrated within a few low wage sectors of the economy versus the pandemic affecting low wage workers in a number of sectors across the economy.
Our results indicate that the experience of low wage workers is not entirely due to these workers being concentrated in low wage sectors � for many sectors, the lowest wage quintile in that sector also has had the worst employment outcomes. Another important finding is that even for those who remain employed during the pandemic, the probability of becoming part-time for economic reasons increased, especially for low-wage workers.
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